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Received 1 February 2007; revised 14 September 2007; accepted 31 October 2007AbstractWe investigate strategic voting at German Bundestag elections. The common intuition about strategic voting holds that sup-
porters of small party candidates split their ticket and cast a constituency vote for the candidate of a viable large party. We
show that there is more potential for strategic voting than previously admitted. Based on the multiparty calculus of voting frame-
work, we formulate a decision-theoretic model that allows us to take the full range of situations into account, that voters may en-
counter in their local constituencies. Applying this model to survey data from the 1998 and 2002 federal elections, we find that
voters make use of sophisticated balloting, given the chance to influence the outcome of the constituency election. While the focus
of this paper is on Germany, the approach we take is applicable to single seat elections in other countries as well.
 2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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In every general election roughly half themembers of
the German parliament (Bundestag) are elected from
local constituencies. In each constituency, a single seat
is awarded to the candidate who wins a plurality of the
vote. All other votes are discarded. Such ‘‘winner takes
all’’ or ‘‘first past the post’’ (FPTP) election rules dis-
favor candidates with low electoral prospects and
make any vote for such candidates essentially wasted.
To avoid wasting their vote on hopeless candidates
voters sometimes switch to less preferred but more
promising candidates, usually one of the top two
contenders. Such voting behavior is termed strategic Corresponding author. Tel.: þ49 (0)621 181 2856; fax: þ49
(0)621 181 2845.
E-mail address: michael.herrmann@mzes.uni-mannheim.de (M.
Herrmann).
0261-3794/$ - see front matter  2007 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007
Please cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007or tactical and it differs from na€ıve voting insofar as
voters deliberately seek to influence the outcome of
the election instead of merely revealing their preference
for a certain candidate.
Strategic voting is interesting insofar as electoral
outcomes are not pre-determined by voters’ prefer-
ences, which are more or less stable over the course
of an election, but also by short-term swings in support
from weak to strong candidates. If voters are short-term
responsive to the electoral situation, strong candidates,
in a close race, will be able to attract votes from sup-
porters of weaker candidates. The extent towhich voters
adjust their behavior to the electoral situation thus has
important implications for party strategy. For example,
in running constituency campaigns, parties of the lead-
ing candidates may draw off support from weaker can-
didates by portraying the situation as a neck-and-neck
race. In this paper we will examine the responsiveness
of German voters to electoral competition in singleStrategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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candidate votes? An answer to this question might help
evaluate the potential of parties to influence constitu-
ency outcomes and also contribute to our understanding
of the boundaries of voter sophistication in German
federal elections.
When designing the German electoral system after
World War II, the idea of adopting a pure FPTP system
had strong support among several members of the par-
liamentary council. Post-war military government and
the Christian Democrats (with support from the German
Party, DP) strongly favored FPTP over proportional
representation (PR). However, opposition by Social
Democrats and the Liberal Party eventually led to the
adoption of a mixture of PR and single seat constituen-
cies, which is hitherto employed in federal elections
(Bawn, 1993). Despite their long-standing presence in
German politics, constituency elections have not re-
ceived much scholarly attention.1 Common wisdom
among observers and scholars of German politics, as
well as most German voters, suggests that the PR vote
is more important than the constituency vote for deter-
mining parties’ seat shares in parliament. Electoral law
prescribes that constituency candidates merely fill seats
allocated to their party according to proportional repre-
sentation. Under normal circumstances, they do not add
extra seats to their party. Consequently one might argue
that voters should not care very much about who wins
their constituency since it would not affect parties’
seat shares in parliament. Notwithstanding such claims,
we believe there are at least three reasons why the con-
stituency ballot should be important to voters.
First, the importance of the PR over the candidate
vote is to a large part an empirical phenomenon not
an institutional fact. Electoral law guarantees successful
constituency candidates a mandate even if their party’s
state-wide share of PR votes provided them with an
insufficient number of parliamentary seats. Such excess
seats (U¨berhangmandate) increase parties’ seat shares
beyond the level of regular PR allocation. While excess
seats have long been considered unlikely and rare, their
occurrence has markedly increased in the post re-
unification period. On average 3.5% of all constituency
candidates since 1990 obtained excess seats. The most
recent election of 2005 even witnessed an all time
high of 5%. Winning those additional seats may be
decisive for forming governmental majorities. As it
is somewhat hard to predict, though, which constituen-
cies will be more likely to yield excess seats, any1 See Wu¨st et al. (2006) for a recent counter-example.
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voters should care about it.
Second, even if most seats are allocated according to
PR, it may still play a role for the individual voter,
whether those seats are filled with rank-and-file party
delegates or representatives from their local environ-
ment. Nomination of constituency candidates is nor-
mally carried out by small boards of local party
delegates (Kreisdelegiertenversammlungen), with little
outside influence by higher party executives. Party list
members, by contrast, are elected on state-wide party
conventions (Landesparteitage). Thus, while list mem-
bers are likely to be selected on the basis of partisan as-
sets (such as loyalty, ideology or technocratic skill),
nomination of constituency candidates should be rather
guided by their overall attractiveness to local constitu-
ents, not only to partisans but voters in general. The
greater detachedness of constituency candidates from
their party grassroots creates a subtle incentive for sup-
porters of hopeless candidates to cast an alternative
vote: As a typical example, consider a supporter of
the FDP in a constituency where the margin of victory
between CDU and SPD candidates is small. Assuming
her second preference is CDU, she might ask herself:
‘Given that my vote will be decisive, does it make a dif-
ference if I switched to the candidate of CDU? ’ The an-
swer is yes, because if the CDU candidate gets elected
he will fill a seat that would otherwise fall to a ‘‘face-
less’’ party list member who does not hold any interest
whatsoever in her constituency. By giving her vote to
the CDU candidate the voter may effectively increase
the similarity between CDU and herself as a constituent.
Thus even if the constituency outcome would not alter
parties’ seat shares in parliament, influencing the com-
position of parliamentary fractions still serves as a mo-
tive for sophisticated balloting.
A third argument for the importance of constituency
elections is also tied to candidates’ party affiliation.
Given that a voter evaluates candidates mainly on the
basis of their party affiliation, it should not be irrelevant
to her, whether she is being represented by a candidate
from one or another party. Hence if the candidate from
her preferred party is out of the race, she should be
likely to switch to the candidate of a less preferred party
in order to avoid the victory of a candidate from a party
she does not like at all.
Taken together, we believe that there are good rea-
sons for voters to care about the outcome of constitu-
ency elections and to vote strategically. The extent to
which German voters actually make use of strategic bal-
loting is ultimately an empirical question and we ad-
dress it accordingly. Our findings suggest that GermanStrategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
3 Simplex representation exploits the fact that election results are
bounded by the constraint that vote shares must add to one. An other-
wise three-dimensional plot of party A’s vote share against party B’s
and C’s vote shares can thus be reduced to a two-dimensional equi-
lateral triangle, since all election outcomes lie on a triangular plane,
defined by the points (1,0,0) to (0,1,0) to (0,0,1). Data on election re-
sults can be obtained from the bureau of the federal elections officer
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dicted by strategic voting theory.
2. Strategic voting in German constituency
elections
In the context of the German mixed PR plurality sys-
tem, the notion of strategic voting is usually tied to the
constituency ballot. While there is some value in the
claim that German voters also cast strategic PR votes
(Gschwend, 2007), we shall use the term ‘strategic
voting’ exclusively to designate voter behavior in single-
member plurality elections. Previous studies have ad-
dressed the question of strategic voting mainly through
analyses of aggregate vote statistics.2 For example, Cox
(1997) and Bawn (1999) examine gaps between candi-
date and party vote shares across constituencies and
find that, in close constituency elections, those gaps in-
crease in favor of major party candidates and to the det-
riment of minor party candidates. If one assumes that
a party’s true underlying level of support can be inferred
from the number of list votes, the observed differences
should be the result of split voting by small party sup-
porterswho cast their constituency vote for a viablemajor
party candidate.
As pointed out in the literature, though, there may be
other reasons for splitting one’s ticket between a large
and a small party, such as protest voting by large party
supporters (i.e. when they perceive the constituency
race as a foregone conclusion) (Cox, 1997), expressing
one’s preference for a particular coalition (Roberts,
1988; Schoen, 1999; Pappi and Thurner, 2002), or strate-
gic balloting in reverse order, i.e. a sincere constituency
vote but a strategic party list vote (Gschwend, 2007).
The latter type of strategic voting follows from pre-
electoral coalition announcements by German parties
combined with the threat confronting small parties via
the 5% threshold of representation. Together these two
features may cause some voters, who would rather sup-
port a major party, to give their PR vote to its junior coa-
lition partner, in order to avoid the victory of the opposing
coalition (threshold insurance: Cox, 1997, 197).
Given these alternative explanations, the validity of
aggregate analyses in confirming strategic voting ap-
pears somewhat limited. More insight could be gained
from additional analyses on the individual level, control-
ling for the different motivations voters may hold. Along
these lines Pappi and Thurner (2002) find evidence for2 See Fisher (1973), Jesse (1988), Cox (1997), Bawn (1999),
Schoen (1999), Gschwend et al. (2003).
Please cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
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(2007) successfully shows that the most frequently ob-
served patterns of ticket splitting can be explained either
by a ‘wasted vote’ or a ‘coalition insurance’ strategy.
Departing from these studies, we will focus exclu-
sively on the constituency ballot. This enables a more di-
rect test for strategic voting and also provides us with
predictive estimates of the extent to which voters engage
in this kind of behavior. It also allows for amuchmore de-
tailed examination of voter responsiveness to electoral in-
centives. In fact, a major drawback of all previous
attempts lies in the classification of viable and non-viable
candidates. Previous studies have only regarded major
party candidates (i.e. CDU and SPD) as viable and thus
identified likely strategic voters solely among small party
supporters, i.e. FDP, Greens, or PDS. Convenient as such
a distinction may be for addressing electoral competition
in West Germany, it misses out some of the most impor-
tant aspects of electoral competition in East German con-
stituencies. East German voters are faced with an
essentially more diverse and complex electoral environ-
ment, which in turn provides them with more options
for strategic voting than previously admitted.
To see how the electoral situation differs between
East and West German constituencies, consider the dia-
grams in Figs. 1e3. Each figure displays the distribution
of constituency results for one of the three most recent
Bundestag elections in simplex form.3 On the left-hand
side of each figure the vote shares of SPD and CDU can-
didates (i.e. CSU candidates for Bavarian constituen-
cies) are plotted against the total share of all other
candidates. The three right-hand side diagrams of each
figure display the vote shares of FDP, Greens and PDS
candidates against the shares of SPD and CDU candi-
dates. The top right-hand side diagram, for instance,
plots the vote shares of CDU, SPD and PDS candidates
relative to each other, excluding other candidates’ vote
shares. Hence one can interpret the right-hand side
diagrams as indicating the relative strengths of the
respective candidates in every constituency.4(Bundeswahlleiter) at http://www.bundeswahlleiter.de.
4 Detailed explanations of these diagrams and their application
with respect to multiparty competition can be found in Grofman
et al. (2004), Gschwend and Leuffen (2005), Katz and King
(1999), Miller (1977), and Upton (1994).
Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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CDU
SPD
Greens
CDU
SPD
FDP
CDU
Fig. 1. Constituency results in 1998 (N ¼ 328).
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The closer a district result is to one of the three vertices
the larger the vote share of the respective party’s candi-
date in that constituency. Consider, for instance, the
left-hand side diagram in Fig. 1. The closer a result is
to the CDU vertex, the larger the CDU candidate’s
vote share in that particular district. An outcome in
which the CDU candidate wins the entire vote would
correspond to a point located on the vertex. Thus,
roughly speaking, as we move away from the CDU ver-
tex, the vote shares of CDU candidates decrease while
vote shares of SPD or other candidates increase. To
highlight the areas in which a party’s candidate wins
a plurality of the vote, dashed lines are drawn into the
plots. They divide each diagram into three kite-shaped
regions, which we shall refer to as win regions. All con-
stituencies falling into one of these areas are won by the
candidate of the party associated with the respective
vertex, e.g. a constituency falling into the lower right
area in the left-hand graph in Fig. 1 is won by thePlease cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007CDU candidate. If two candidates obtain equal vote
shares, the respective outcome is located on one of the
dashed lines, e.g. if CDU and SPD candidates are tied
for first place, the respective district outcome lies some-
where on the vertical line perpendicular to the bottom
edge of the triangle. At the intersection of the lines of
tiesdthe centroid of the triangledall three parties ob-
tain one-third of the vote. Finally, note that differences
in the overall number of constituencies between 1998
and later elections are due to a reduction in parliamen-
tary seats, which led to redistricting and the resolution
of 29 constituencies between 1998 and 2002.
Inspecting Figs. 1e3, it is apparent that East and
West German constituencies differ from each other.
West German districts are obviously characterized by
two-party competition between candidates of CDU
and SPD, as can be seen from the left-hand diagrams
in each figure. Other candidates play virtually no role,
since, even when combining their vote shares, results
are still located at clear distance from the center. ByStrategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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Fig. 2. Constituency results in 2002 (N ¼ 299).
6 Constituencies where PDS candidates finish second are those in-
side SPD’s or CDU’s win region that lie closer to the line of ties be-
tween SPD and PDSdor CDU and PDS, respectivelydthan to the
line of ties between CDU and SPD. The order of finish between
CDU, SPD and PDS candidates can generally be inferred by bisect-
ing each win region into two right-angled triangles, each containing
districts in which the party whose associated win region is adjacent to
the triangle finishes second (see Miller, 1977; Grofman et al., 2004).
For instance, bisecting the win region associated with the SPD can-
didate yields an upper triangle, adjacent to the PDS candidate’s win
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share of votes for third party candidates, which draws
those constituencies closer to the center of the triangle.5
This pattern may be due to a generally weaker perfor-
mance of CDU and SPD candidates in East Germany,
but it may also arise from a particularly better perfor-
mance of certain third party candidates there.
To get to these specifics, we turn to the right-hand
side diagrams, which give the distribution of results
for East and West German constituencies stratified by
the three small parties PDS, Greens and FDP. We can
see that CDU and SPD candidates do not lose votes
equally to small party candidates in East Germany,
but particularly to candidates of PDS. In each of the
three elections, those candidates win a substantially
larger fraction of votes than their FDP and Greens coun-
terparts. They even manage to win some constituencies5 Note that there is one constituency in 1998 (Fu¨rstenwalde-Straus-
berg-Seelow) where the CDU failed to field a candidate. The respec-
tive outcome is therefore located on the edge of the triangle.
Please cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007or finish second after SPD in others (in 2005, they also
finish second after CDU in some constituencies).6 Be-
sides, there is also one exceptionally strong Green can-
didate, Christian Stroebele, who finished second in
1998 and managed to win his constituency (Berlin-Frie-
drichshain-Kreuzberg) in 2002 and 2005. Comparing
elections over time, outcomes in 2005 appear somewhatregion, and a lower triangle adjacent to the CDU candidate’s win re-
gion. Hence the PDS candidate finishes second after SPD in districts
falling into the upper triangle and the CDU candidate finishes second
after SPD in districts falling into the lower triangle. The same logic
applies with respect to districts won by CDU or PDS candidates.
Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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Fig. 3. Constituency results in 2005 (N ¼ 299).
7 In fact all the studies cited in Section 2 hinge on the assumption
that candidates and their electoral prospects can be distinguished on
the basis of party membership.
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those in 1998 and 2002.
Overall, East German constituencies exhibit more
heterogeneity than West German constituencies. In
some districts SPD and CDU candidates finish first
and second, in others candidates of SPD and PDS as-
sume the top two positions, and yet in some districts
candidates of CDU, SPD and PDS all obtain about equal
shares of votes. Also, in a race between CDU, SPD and
PDS, the candidate finishing third is never trailing as
much as they would under West German conditions,
where candidates of the two large parties win the lion’s
share of the vote. The conclusion we draw from this ob-
servation is that the electoral environment in East Ger-
many generally features three viable candidates as
opposed to only two in West Germany. Therefore, the
clear-cut distinction between large parties and small
parties, which is commonly assumed in the literature
does not readily extend to East German constituencies,
where PDS candidates successfully compete againstPlease cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007those of CDU and SPD. An appropriate model of stra-
tegic voting has to take the role of PDS seriously and
account for these differences in the electoral environ-
ment. Such a model is now laid out.
3. Model and hypotheses
In this section, we outline the model that allows us to
test for strategic voting in German constituencies.
Throughout the analysis we maintain the assumption
that voters’ support for the various candidates is guided
by their party preferences. This assumption is critical
for our research strategy and while we are not the first
to make this assumption we cannot offer an improve-
ment over prior attempts in this respect.7 Still we
believe it is a reasonable assumption. Intuitively, weStrategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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ency is represented by a candidate of one or another
party (say CDU or SPD). Of course, in real world elec-
tions one would expect candidate support to depend on
other factors as well, e.g. candidate personality, incum-
bency status, or campaign spending. Ideally, one would
control for all these factors in an empirical analysis, but
this was not feasible with the available data.8
More importantly, there is a rationale for believing
that party preferences are the main driving force behind
strategic candidate votes: After all, even a voter who is
completely ignorant towards the candidates themselves
can easily infer their party membership from the ballot
on election day, as candidates are explicitly labeled and
placed next to their party’s position on the PR ballot.
Given that the voter has some idea about the support
levels of the parties in her constituency, she can also de-
duce candidates’ likely support levels from their party
membership. Party membership thus provides a com-
mon frame of reference for voters and might serve as
a benchmark for evaluating candidates along with their
relative support levels in the constituency. It is for that
reason, we believe, that if there is strategic voting in
German constituencies we would expect to find it along
partisan lines.
To model strategic voting, we take a decision-
theoretic approach. Specifically, we employ the calculus
of voting concept for multi-candidate elections (McKel-
vey and Ordeshook, 1972), which is used in formal
models of strategic voting (Palfrey, 1989; Myerson
and Weber, 1993; Cox, 1994; Myatt, 2007) as well as
in a number of empirical studies (Black, 1978; Cain,
1978; Ordeshook and Zeng, 1997; Fisher, 2004). The
main reason we take this approach is that it allows us
to capture the full extent of strategic voting in East
and West German constituencies alike. Being a general
theoretical concept, the multi-candidate calculus of vot-
ing is supposed to be applicable to any kind of plurality
election involving three or more candidates. Moreover,
testing for strategic voting with this model, at the
same time, yields some insights into the applicability
of formal voting theory to the German case. Apart
from that, we believe that an approach closely guided
by theory is most likely to produce unbiased and reliable
estimates of strategic voting (cf. Alvarez and Nagler,
2000, 63e64). Hence, to us, it appears as the most
promising avenue to start from.8 Given these limitations, the results we obtain need to be inter-
preted against the backdrop of potential confounding factors (see
Section 4.1).
Please cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007To begin with, consider the following expression for
the expected utility gain of voting for candidate i:
Gi ¼
X
jsi
pij

Ui Uj
 ð1Þ
Myerson andWeber (1993, 104) refer to this as voters’
prospective rating of candidate i (see alsoMcKelvey and
Ordeshook, 1972; Black, 1978; Hoffman, 1982; Cox,
1994). Intuitively this equation can be interpreted as a se-
ries of pairwise comparisons between candidate i and all
other candidates j, where pij denotes the probability that
someone’s vote is decisive in changing the winner of the
election from j to i, and Ui  Uj denotes the utility gain
derived from this event.9 If we label the candidates ac-
cording to their rank in the voter’s preference ordering,
then G1 denotes the expected utility gain of voting for
one’s most preferred candidate, G2 the expected utility
gain of voting second preference, and so on. A voter is
assumed to choose the candidate i that maximizes her
expected utility gain, i.e. to vote for the candidate iwhose
associated valueGi is greater than theGj associated with
a vote for any other candidate j. Accordingly we can
define a vote for the top ranked candidate as sincere
and a vote for the candidate ranked second as strategic.
In doing so, we a priori exclude the possibility of
voting for a candidate ranked third or lower. Even
though it would, in principle, be possible to stipulate
a model that would allow for third and fourth preference
voting, the restriction to a binary choice is mainly done
with regard to the fact that preference orderings with
non-viable candidates on the first two (or three) ranks
are very rare. Employing a polychotomous choice
model would thus hardly yield meaningful estimates
of third and fourth preference voting.
Note further that the definition of a second prefer-
ence vote as strategic excludes other reasons for second
preference voting, such as personal votes for popular
candidates from parties other than the most preferred
one. While such alternative motivations can be safely
ignored in a theoretical model of purely instrumental
voting, their empirical presence may entail measure-
ment error in the actual identification of strategic voters
(an issue to which we shall come back in the discussion
of our results).9 Following McKelvey and Ordeshook (1972) and Myerson and
Weber (1993) we assume that the probability of being decisive be-
tween three or more candidates is negligibly small compared to the
probability of being decisive between two candidates, hence the
probabilities of ties between three or more parties are considered
zero.
Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
10 Note that voters must hold at least one viable candidate on either
first or second rank. For voters holding first and second preferences
for candidates of (non-viable) small parties the p terms are irrelevant
as the chances of getting their first or second preference elected are
both equally small.
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voting, a voter is assumed to face a dichotomous choice
and to vote sincerely, whenever the expected gain of
voting first preference exceeds that of voting second
preference. This means she is assumed to vote sincerely
if G1  G2 > 0 and strategically if G1  G2 < 0, where
G1 G2 ¼
X
js1
p1j B1j 
X
js2
p2j B2j ð2Þ
For simplicity, the utility differentials are denoted
shorthand as B1j ¼ U1  Uj and B2j ¼ U2  Uj. B2j
thus denotes the utility gain derived from changing the
election result from a victory of one’s jth preferenced
where candidate j is ranked third or lowerdto a victory
of one’s second preference. Likewise p2j denotes the
probability of being pivotal in a race between one’s sec-
ond and jth preferred candidate. As can be seen, larger
p1jB1j terms influence individual decision making in
favor of sincere (first preference) voting, while larger
p2jB2j terms influence individual decision making in
favor of strategic (second preference) voting.
To give a simple example, consider the typical situ-
ation of an individual voter in a West German district.
The voter might prefer the candidate of the Green party
who is running very poorly in her electoral district. Her
third and fifth preferred candidates also have little
chance of winning the constituency, but the race is close
between her second and fourth preference, i.e. the can-
didates of SPD and CDU. Hence p24 should be large,
compared to the other pivot probabilities p12, p13, p14,
p15 p23, and p25. Thus from the perspective of influenc-
ing the election result that voter should have a strong
tendency to vote for her second preference, SPD, in or-
der to prevent the victory of the less preferred CDU can-
didate. Note that this tendency is the more pronounced,
the larger B24, i.e. the more she prefers the SPD candi-
date over the CDU candidate. Conversely, her incentive
to desert the Green candidate is the weaker the larger
B12, i.e. the more she favors the Green candidate over
the SPD candidate.
As we have seen in the previous section, the scenario
just described is quite typical for supporters of Green
party candidates in West German districts (and also
for supporters of FDP and PDS candidates). Indeed,
the fact that candidate support is distributed highly un-
equal across parties and across East and West German
districts allows us to simplify the above decision calcu-
lus, by ruling out a number of constellations voters are
unlikely to face in their electoral district. For instance,
a West German voter supporting the candidate of
CDU should have no reason to deliberate aboutPlease cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007scenarios in which her vote will be decisive in a race be-
tween her preferred candidate and any other but the
SPD candidate. All other candidates can be considered
marginal in the race for first place. It should also be of
little importance how likely she is to influence a race for
first place between her second preference and a lesser
preferred candidate, because the CDU candidate is al-
ways a viable option.
On the other hand, deciding whether to vote sin-
cerely or not, supporters of FDP, PDS and Green candi-
dates should be sensitive to the closeness of the race
between the candidates of CDU and SPD, as long as
they hold a second preference for one of them. Since
their expectations of being decisive between their first
preference and any other candidate in the constituency
are negligibly small, their decision should instead be
driven by the perception of being decisive between
CDU and SPD. Hence, upon deciding whether to cast
a sincere or strategic vote, any consideration of being
decisive between some pair of candidates from parties
other than CDU and SPD should be irrelevant for
a West German voter, as the chances of being decisive
between any other combination (e.g. CDU vs. FDP,
SPD vs. PDS, or FDP vs. Greens) are minuscule, com-
pared to the chances of influencing the race between
CDU and SPD.
We can introduce this feature of West German
constituencies into the decision calculus in Eq. (2) by
setting p1j ¼ 0 and/or p2j ¼ 0 in Eq. (2), for all compari-
sons involving candidates from either FDP, Greens or
PDS. Thus, for West German constituencies, we con-
sider only candidates of CDU and SPD as viable op-
tions. Depending on voters’ preference orderings, this
leads us to distinguish three types (or classes) of voters,
which are displayed in Table 1.10
To see how the introduction of non-viability narrows
down the decision calculus, consider a Type 1 voter.
This voter’s preference profile starts either with
a CDU candidate on first and SPD candidate on second
rank or the other way around. Other (non-viable) candi-
dates receive lower ranks. The voter’s expected gain of
voting first preference reduces to G1 ¼ p12B12, i.e. the
gain derived from being pivotal in a race between first
and second preference. All other terms drop out, due
to their associated zero probabilities. In a similar fash-
ion, the expected gain of voting second preferenceStrategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
Table 1
Voter types for West Germany
Voter type Preference profile (1st,2nd,.,kth,.) G1  G2
Type 1 Viable_ viable_/ 2p12B12
Type 2 Viable_ non-viable_/_ viable_/ p1kB1k
Type 3 Non-viable_ viable_/_ viable_/ p2kB2k
Set of viable candidates, {CDU, SPD}; set of non-viable candidates,
{FDP, Greens, PDS};/ indicates a series of (one or more) non-viable
candidates.
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+ MODELreduces to G2 ¼ p21B21, which is the gain derived from
turning one’s second preference into the winnerd
as opposed to one’s first preference. Thus, for a Type
1 voter, G1  G2 reduces to p12B12  p21B21, which
can be further simplified to 2p12B12, since B12 ¼ B21
and p12 ¼ p21, i.e. the probability of being pivotal be-
tween one’s first and second preference is also the prob-
ability of being decisive between one’s second and first
preference (McKelvey and Ordeshook, 1972; Myerson
andWeber, 1993). Likewise, for Type 2 voters the intro-
duction of zero probabilities for being pivotal results in
G2 ¼ 0 andG1 ¼ p1kB1k, where k indexes the preference
rank of the other viable party, ranked either third, fourth
or fifth. A similar, although reversed, logic applies for
Type 3 voters. As can be seen from Table 1, the ex-
pected utility differential G1  G1 is only negative for
Type 3 voters, who hold a first preference for a candidate
from a non-viable party (FDP, PDS or Greens) and a sec-
ond preference for a candidate from a viable party (SPD
or CDU). Hence, only this group of voters has an incen-
tive to vote strategically. All other voters holding a first
preference for a viable party should vote sincerely.
For East German constituencies, the number of viable
candidates there is roughly three, includingd
besides candidates from CDU and SPDdalso candi-
dates of PDS (see Section 2). As in the West German
context, candidates of FDP and Greens can be consi-
dered non-viable. Thus we assume p1j ¼ 0 and p2j ¼ 0
for every comparison involving either a candidate of
FDP or Greens. Depending on voter’s preferenceTable 2
Voter types for East Germany
Voter type Preference profile (1st,2nd,.,kt
Type 1 Viable_ viable_/_ non-vi
Type 2 Viable_ non-viable_/_ vi
Type 3 Non-viable_ viable_/_ vi
Type 4 Viable_ viable_/_ viable
Set of viable candidates, {CDU, SPD, PDS}; set of non-viable candidates, {
candidates;_/ indicates a series of (one or more) viable or non-viable ca
Please cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
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utility differentials, which are displayed in Table 2.
As can be seen, the first three types of voters are the
same as for the West German context, but due to three
instead of two viable parties one new type is generated.
This category is comprised of voters holding two viable
candidates on first and second and a third one on a lower
preference rank. For these voters the decision to vote
strategically involves comparisons of the most preferred
candidate with the other two, as well as a comparison
between the candidate ranked second and the least pre-
ferred viable candidate. Therefore, in contrast to voters
of Types 1e3, Type 4 voters have both an incentive to
vote sincerely as well as strategically.
To give an example, consider a PDS supporter with
second preference SPD, Greens on third, CDU on fourth
and FDP on fifth rank, who finds herself in a constitu-
ency, where the PDS candidate is runner-up behind
SPD and the CDU candidate comes on third. Her deci-
sion is one between PDS, SPD and CDU, since Greens
and FDP are irrelevant for the outcome of the constitu-
ency election. When comparing the options of voting
for PDS or voting for SPD, she finds that the expected
gain of a sincere vote is higher than that of a strategic
vote, as the chances of influencing the election outcome
between PDS and SPD (p12) are higher than the chances
of being decisive in a race between PDS and CDU (p1k)
or SPD and CDU (p2k). Her incentive to vote sincerely
should be even more pronounced the more she favors
PDS over SPD, i.e. the larger B12 is.
Now consider the same voter in a district, where the
PDS candidate comes third behind SPD and the leading
CDU candidate. Her chances of being pivotal in making
the PDS candidate the winner of the election (either
against SPD or CDU) are now small compared to the
chances of being decisive between her second and third
preference SPD and CDU. The closer those two candi-
dates are together (i.e. the higher p2k) and the more she
favors SPD over CDU (i.e. the higher B2k), the more
likely she should be to desert her first preference and
cast a strategic vote for the SPD candidate. Therefore,h,.) G1  G2
able 2p12B12
able_/ p1kB1k
able_/ p2kB2k
_/ 2p12B12 þ p1kB1k  p2kB2k
FDP, Greens};_/_ indicates a series of (one or more) non-viable
ndidates.
Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
12 In Eq. (3) there are no main effects for variables P1kBik. It is com-
mon practice to include main effects when testing for interactions so
that one variable can still have an effect if the other variable is zero.
In our case the P and B variables are constructed in such a way that
a value of zero on one variable theoretically implies a value of zerod
and hence no effectdof the other variable (see Section 3.1); it is thus
meaningful to use the PB terms alone (see also Ordeshook and Zeng,
1997, 173). Likelihood ratio tests also confirmed that the inclusion of
main effects did not improve the fit of the model, nor did the inclu-
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bility of a strategic vote. Rather, her incentive to vote
strategically should increase with p2kB2k, while her in-
centive to vote sincerely should increase with p12B12
and p1kB1k.
Assembling the terms from Tables 1 and 2, we can
formulate the following empirical model for strategic
voting. Define the outcome variable as Y ¼ 1 if some-
one votes for her first and Y ¼ 0 if she votes for her sec-
ond preference, then the probability of observing
a sincere as opposed to a strategic vote can be expressed
with a probit model:11
PrðY ¼ 1Þ ¼Fðaþ b1P12B12 þ b2P1kB1k þ b3P2kB2k
þ gtTYPEtÞ ð3Þ
The term a denotes an overall constant, indicating
the baseline amount of sincere voting. One may think
of this coefficient as capturing the effect of other un-
measured factors that might lead a voter to cast a sincere
vote, e.g. candidate preference, party identification, etc.
TYPEt denotes a (row)vector of t dummy variables with
associated coefficients gt. Each dummy variable scores
1 if the voter is of type t (e.g. Type 3), otherwise zero.
This means that if, for instance, t ¼ 2 the variables
P12B12 and P2kB2k are zero. The coefficients gt capture
differences in the average amount of sincere voting
between the individual voter types. Our expectations
concerning these differences are as follows:
1. Type 2 voters, holding a viable party on first and
a non-viable party on second rank, should have
the highest coefficient, i.e. the highest probability
of a sincere vote, since they have the chance of be-
ing decisive between their first and a much less
preferred alternative.
2. Type 1 voters should have a lower coefficient than
Type 2 voters, since they can only be decisive bet-
ween first and second preference, i.e. their expected
gain is somewhat lower.
3. Type 4 voters have incentives to vote both sin-
cerely and strategically, hence their coefficient
should be lower than that of Type 1 voters, who
have no incentive for strategic voting.
4. Type 3 voters have no incentive to vote sincerely,
hence their coefficient should be lowest.11 The factor 2 from 2p12B12 is irrelevant to the estimation of b1 and
is thus dropped from Eq. (3).
Please cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007Since these differences should fully depend on vot-
er’s strength of preference and perceived pivot probabil-
ities, we expect them to disappear once we control for
the PB variables in the model. Specifically, strategic
voting implies that:
5. The coefficient for P2kB2k should be negative.
6. The coefficients for P12B12 and P1kB1k should be
positive.12
In sum, our empirical model captures the notion
commonly found in the literature that West German
supporters of CDU or SPD should vote sincerely,
whereas supporters of FDP, Greens and PDS have an in-
centive to defect from their first preference, but it goes
beyond that by also accounting for situations where the
order of finish between winner and first loser on the dis-
trict level is determined by three parties, CDU, SPD and
PDS, which is generally the case in East German dis-
tricts. Furthermore we focus not only on voter expecta-
tions but on their relative preferences as well, since
theoretically, they are equally important for the decision
to vote strategically.
At this point, the question may arise why the restric-
tions on pivot probabilities are introduced at all, since
Eq. (2) could be used as an empirical model right
away. There are two main reasons not to use Eq. (2) di-
rectly, one practical and the other substantive. From
a practical point of view, estimating the entire calculus
equation would lead to low cell frequencies and a poor
estimation of the effects of p24B24 and p25B25. Since
longer preference rankings are less likely than shorter
ones, we expect less observations for p24B24 than for
p23B23 and even less for p25B25. However, for the deci-
sion to vote strategically one term may be just as rele-
vant as the other. In fact, as we have seen above,
which term is in fact relevant dependsdfor mostsion of interaction effects improve the fit of a main effects model.
Model comparisons on the basis of Bayesian information criterion
(and other goodness-of-fit measures that adjust for unequal degrees
of freedom) further confirmed that our version of the model should
be preferred over both, a simple additive main effects model, as
well as a main effects model with interaction terms (results available
from the authors).
Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
15 For instance, respondents with two or more parties tied for first
rank were excluded from the analysis. Likewise, respondents with
no third preference (i.e. all parties other than first rank are tied for
second preference) were not considered. Respondents with first and
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dates in their preference ordering. If one candidate is
ranked second and the other ranked third, p23B23 should
be the decisive component; if the other is on fifth,
p25B25 should make the difference. All other terms
should be small (or close to zero). Likewise, for the de-
cision to vote sincerely, it is again the placement of can-
didates that matters. If the CDU candidate is on first and
the other viable candidate on third rank, p13B13 should
make the difference; if the other candidate is on fourth
rank, it should be p14B14. Our approach is to simply pool
all relevant terms into two components p2kB2k and
p1kB1k, which can be effectively estimated with the
available data.
Substantively, we can also learn more about likely
strategic voters through the categorization into the voter
types given above. Specifically, it allows us to distin-
guish between strategic voting by supporters of candi-
dates that are sure losers in constituency races (Type
3), and by those (slightly more interesting voters) who
support one of three potentially viable candidates in
East German constituencies (Type 4). This would not
be possible from a direct implementation of Eq. (2),
which basically lumps together supporters of all candi-
dates. Overall, our distinction of four voter types thus
makes the analysis both tractable and easier to interpret.
3.1. Data and measurement
We use data from two national pre-election surveys
conducted in 1998 (N ¼ 1608) and 2002 (N ¼ 1632).13
A similar survey was also administered in 2005, how-
ever, by the time we conducted our analysis the data
were not yet available. Voters’ preference rankings
were constructed from party feeling thermometers (see
Appendix A.2 for the wording of the thermometer ques-
tion).14 Based on those rankings, we identified respon-
dents as belonging to one of the four voter types
introduced above. From all respondents who provided
non-missing information on their voting decision and
(at least three) thermometer ratings (roughly 72% in
both samples), respondents whose preference rankings
did not match one of the four types were excluded13 Both surveys were part of the project ‘Politische Einstellungen,
politische Partizipation und Wa¨hlerverhalten im vereinigten Deutsch-
land’, conducted by Ju¨rgen Falter, Oscar Gabriel and Hans Rattinger.
Datasets can be obtained from ‘Central Archive for Empirical Social
Research’ at http://www.gesis.org/en/za; Archive no: ZA 3066 and
ZA 3861.
14 For Bavarian respondents feeling thermometers towards CSU
were employed in place of CDU thermometers.
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as 1 if a respondent reported to vote for a party he ranked
first (sincere vote) and 0 if he reported voting for a party
he ranked second (strategic vote). Respondents who re-
ported to vote for a party they ranked third or lower were
not considered for the analysis.16 Overall 52% of the re-
spondents in the 1998 and 50% in the 2002 sample were
identified as Type 1, 2, 3 or 4 voterswho report voting for
either first (roughly 90% in both samples) or second
preference (roughly 10%). This group comprises the
final sample for the analysis.
Voters’ relative preferences for the candidates of
each party were computed as differences in standard-
ized party thermometer scores. Formally, for each indi-
vidual voter the standardized thermometer differences
were computed as Bij ¼ ðbi  bjÞ=s, where bi and bj
are the raw thermometer values assigned to candidates
i and j and s is the standard deviation of thermometer
scores assigned by the individual voter. Standardization
ensures that variation in variables Bij is solely due to in-
tra-individual differences in the assignment of ther-
mometer scores. Different voters might have different
interpretations about the scaling of their response.
Thus a voter who assigns to candidates the values 3, 5
and 7 on a scale from 1 to 11, might well have the
same in mind as a voter who assigns to them the values
8, 9 and 10 (with the order of candidates being the
same). Based on raw thermometer scores we would
conclude that the first voter holds stronger preferences
between candidates than the second voter. On the other
hand, it is just as possible that both voters feel equally
strong about the candidates and simply hold different
perceptions as to how their preferences translate into
the response format. Ultimately there is no standard
for comparing utility differences inter-individually,
therefore we considered it worthwhile to attenuate var-
iation in utility judgments between individuals. That is
to say we place more weight on variation in utilitysecond preferences for non-viable parties were excluded as well. In
one way or another, our model yields no prediction for any of these
respondents, i.e. we cannot formulate hypotheses as to whether they
should vote for first or second preference.
16 While it is possible, in principle, for such behavior to qualify as
strategic, i.e. voting for someone’s third preference to avoid the suc-
cess of a lesser preferred alternative, if one’s first and second prefer-
ence are non-viable, we restrict our attention to strategic second
preference voting. In addition, a preliminary investigation showed
that the number of voters voting for a candidate ranked third or lower
is very small (about 3% in both samples).
Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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standardization the two voters above, for example,
would both be assigned thermometer differences of
about 1.225.
For the measurement of voter pivotality, we follow
Black (1978) who calculates decisiveness as Euclidian
distances of constituency results to outcomes in which
a voter would have been decisive in determining the
winner.17 To give an example, consider an East German
district in which PDS, SPD and CDU candidates obtain
shares of 0.40, 0.36 and 0.24, respectively, and a voter
who ranks the candidates in the same order. The three
quantities of interest in this case are the probabilities
of a tie for the lead between PDS and SPD (i.e. P12),
PDS and CDU (i.e. P13), and SPD and CDU (i.e. P23).
A measure for the probability of being decisive between
PDS and SPD can be obtained by calculating the
distance between the outcome (0.40, 0.36, 0.24) and
the closest outcome in which the voter would have
been pivotal, i.e. (0.38, 0.38, 0.24). The Euclidian dis-
tance between the two outcomes is calculated as
[(0.40  0.38)2 þ (0.36 0.38)2 þ (0.24  0.24)2]1/2 ¼
0.028. Dividing this quantity by the distance that can
maximally be obtained and subtracting from one yields
a proxy for the pivot probability that ranges from zero
(when one party wins the entire vote) to one (when
two parties are tied for first place). Other measures of
decisiveness can be calculated in a similar way (for
a more detailed explanation of this procedure, see
Appendix A.1 or Black, 1978, 634ff.).
4. Results
The results of our model estimations for the 1998
and 2002 elections, respectively, are given in Table 3.
For each election year, the left-hand columns display
the results for the restricted models, including only
the indicator variables for the different voter types,
and the right-hand columns give the results for the
full model including the PB terms. We use one-tailed
tests for evaluating our results, since we are interested
in whether coefficients point significantly in the17 To compute distances, we used constituency results of the current
election. Some scholars prefer to use results of the previous election
(e.g. Alvarez and Nagler, 2000). We believe that current election re-
sults more closely resemble the situation in electoral districts at the
time survey data were collected. Hence we expect them to better ap-
proximate voter’s expectations than results from previous elections.
Apart from that, due to federal redistricting between 1998 and
2002 constituency results in 1998 could not be matched with those
in 2002.
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Our first set of hypotheses concerned differences be-
tween the four voter types identified in Section 3. Ac-
cordingly, Type 2 voters should show the highest
tendency for sincere voting, followed by Type 1, Type
4 and Type 3 voters. As can be seen from Table 3, all
group effects follow the predicted order. In both elec-
tions, Type 2 voters (the reference group, with coeffi-
cient fixed at zero) have the highest propensity to cast
a sincere vote followed by Type 1, Type 4 and Type 3
voters. All differences, except for Type 1 voters in
2002 are statistically significant (p < 0.05). As ex-
pected, Type 3 voters show the highest propensity to
vote strategically, since they find themselves unani-
mously in a situation where their most preferred candi-
date is out of the race. Concerning our third hypothesis,
the difference between Type 4 and Type 1 votersd
albeit in the right directionddoes not reach statistical
significance. Thus, although there is potential for strate-
gic voting among Type 4 voters it does not suffice to dis-
tinguish them from voters whose first and second
preference are both viable options in the constituency.
It does, however, distinguish them from the other,
more motivated, group of (Type 2) sincere voters whose
most preferred candidate is competing against a candi-
date ranked third or lower. Overall, while some of the
group effects could be more pronounced none of the
coefficients is at odds with our expectations and most
differences are statistically significant.
Concerning the second set of hypotheses, we have
argued in Section 3, that differences between voter
types should be determined by voters’ relative prefer-
ences and perceived pivotality. Hence differences be-
tween voter types should disappear once we control
for voter preferences and expectations. According to
our theoretical model, we also expect a positive sign
on the coefficients for variables P12B12 and P1kB1k and
a negative sign on the coefficient for P2kB2k. As can
be seen from the right-hand columns, all the coefficients
for the individual groupsdexcept for Type 4 voters in
1998dmarkedly shrink once the PB variables are in-
troduced. On the other hand, all PB coefficients are
correctly signed and most of them are statistically sig-
nificant (p < 0.05). The effects for P12B12 are not sig-
nificant, indicating that being decisive and having
a strong relative preference between one’s first and sec-
ond preference does not create much of an incentive for
sincere voting. A significant incentive for sincere voting
exists, however, if one of the two viable options is on
third or lower preference, as indicated by the effect of
P1kB1k.Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
Table 3
Sincere vs. strategic voting: probit regression results
1998 2002
Type 1a 0.476 (0.196)b 0.107 (0.512) 0.242 (0.172) 0.187 (0.344)
Type 3a 2.037 (0.196)b 0.789 (0.507) 1.335 (0.160)b 0.166 (0.407)
Type 4a 0.671 (0.203)b 0.825 (0.433)b 0.651 (0.173)b 0.093 (0.419)
P12B12 0.601 (0.367) 0.050 (0.161)
P1kB1k 0.534 (0.229)
b 0.314 (0.175)b
P2kB2k 0.369 (0.203)b 0.623 (0.197)b
Const. 2.024 (0.146)b 1.190 (0.366)b 1.668 (0.105)b 1.199 (0.274)b
LL0 269.872 269.872 293.927 293.927
LL1 201.834 194.894 255.807 248.974
N 852 836
a Coefficients for Type 2 voters fixed at zero; for explanation of types, see Tables 1 and 2.
b p < 0.05 one-tailed. Standard errors in parentheses.
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Fig. 4. Strategic voting by voter type.
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term P2kB2k. For strategic voting to be present, this vari-
able must be negatively correlated with sincere voting.
As can be seen, the coefficients for P2kB2k are negative
and significant for both election years, suggesting that
decisiveness and a strong relative preference between
one’s second preference and a less preferred alternative,
indeed, creates an incentive for strategic voting. In sum,
the results presented here provide evidence that German
voters cast their constituency vote strategically, depend-
ing on their preferences and perceived chances of influ-
encing the election outcome. Specifically, the more
a voter favors her second preference over a lower
ranked viable candidate and the closer the race between
the two in her district, the higher the probability that she
casts a strategic vote.
Fig. 4 displays this relationship graphically for
voters with different levels of relative preference
(B2k). The vertical axis indicates the probability of cast-
ing a sincere vote, the horizontal axis indicates voters’
pivotality in deciding between their second and kth
preference (P2k). In the upper panels of Fig. 4 the rela-
tionship is given for Type 3 voters holding a first pref-
erence for a candidate of a non-viable party and
a second preference for a candidate of a viable party.
By design, this group is comprised by supporters of
FDP, Green and PDS candidates in West Germany
and supporters of FDP and Green candidates in East
Germany. Those voters were hypothesized to vote stra-
tegically, with increasing pivot probability and increas-
ing strength of preference, i.e. dislike of a lesser
preferred viable candidate. Note that, for Type 3 voters,
the impact on the election outcome is always measured
as one minus the absolute difference in vote shares
between the two largest parties in the district (see
Appendix A), so one can interpret the horizontal axis
as the reverse of the district margin. An ostensivePlease cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007interpretation of the upper panels of Fig. 4 would hence
be that the closer the district margin, the higher the
probability of FDP and Green supporters (and PDS sup-
porters in West Germany) to vote strategically. This re-
lationship is even more pronounced, the more such
a voter disfavors the winning candidate over the second
finisher. For instance, the probability that a supporter of
the Greens will vote for her second preference SPD isStrategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
Table 4
Actual vs. predicted votes
1998 2002
Sincere Strategic Sincere Strategic
Voted first 749 21 734 8
Voted second 53 29 84 10
Total predicted 802 50 818 18
Column headers indicate predicted behavior; row headers indicate ob-
served behavior (i.e. first vs. second preference voting).
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the more she favors SPD over CDU.
A similar interpretation can be given for Type 4
voters. This group is solely comprised of East German
voters holding first and second preferences for candi-
dates of CDU, SPD or PDS. Note that for this group
of voters the tendency to vote strategically is less pro-
nounced than for Type 3 voters (in 1998 the probability
curve is almost flat). What can also be seen from Fig. 4
is that, overall, Type 4 voters have a higher probability
to cast a sincere vote. This is due to the fact that, unlike
Type 3 voters, Type 4 voters cannot a priori be assumed
to have an incentive to vote strategically, instead they
should defect from their first preference only when it
is trailing in the district race, i.e. when p12 and p1k are
smaller than p2k. For instance, a CDU supporter with
second preference SPD should vote strategically in
a district where the CDU candidate comes third after
SPD and PDS, or more specifically, the more the
CDU candidate is trailing and the closer SPD and
PDS candidates are together. In Fig. 4, P12B12 and
P1kB1k, for a Type 4 voter, are held constant at their
means. Thus, the probability of a strategic vote may ac-
tually be greater than what is displayed in districts
where a voter’s most preferred candidate is out of the
race. Finally, it also appears that the tendency to cast
a strategic vote was slightly stronger in the 2002 elec-
tion, as indicated by the steeper decline of the probabil-
ity curves.
4.1. The relevance of strategic voting
Given the above results, we can ask how good our
model predicts de facto voting for first or second prefer-
ence. Table 4 displays the number of actual against pre-
dicted votes for both elections. Accordingly, our model
correctly classifies 91% of the votes in 1998 and 89% in
2002.18
Among those predicted to cast a strategic vote, 58%
and 56% actually did vote for their second preference.
Ideally, we would have expected those numbers to be
somewhat higher above 50%.Ourmodel thus does not ex-
plain second preference voting as well as wewould wish.
It obviously performs much better at predicting first pref-
erence voting, since 93% and 90% of those predicted to
vote sincerely actually voted for their first preference.
This suggests a higher amount of error in the measure-
ment of second preference voting than first preference18 The actual increase in correct classification due to our model is
9% and 2%, respectively, compared to a prediction based on the dis-
tribution of the dependent variable alone.
Please cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
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in observed second preference voting, as our measure-
ment does not fully sort strategic voting out of other mo-
tivations for casting a second preference vote. For
instance, we cannot rule out the possibility that some ap-
parent second preferencevotes are personal votes for can-
didates of parties other than the preferred party. Also, we
cannot identify large party supporters who perceived the
constituency race as foregone and hence decided to give
their vote to the sure winner (or to express their opinion
on a certain issue by voting for a second preference party
with a strong stand on that issue). Expressing one’s pref-
erence for a certain coalition still serves as anothermotive
forGermanvoters in casting their ballot. Thus, a supporter
of a small party (say FDP) in a non-competitive constitu-
ency may choose to express her coalition preference by
casting a second preference vote for the CDU candidate
and giving her PR vote to FDP.
Eventually, a goodmeasure of strategic voting should
control for voters’ motivations in such a way that all rea-
sons for a second preference vote, save for the individu-
al’s desire to effectively influence the election result, are
ruled out (cf. Fisher, 2004; Blais et al., 2005). Additional
questioning of voters’ motivations for deserting their
preferred partydthe standard nowadays in British and
Canadian election studiesdwould surely improve the
measurement of strategic voting and possibly reduce
some of the prediction error in classifying voters as stra-
tegic. However, no such information was available for
the election surveys employed here.
From our estimates, we predict a share of roughly 6%
strategic voters in the final sample for the 1998 and 2%
for the 2002 election. Thus, based on the original samples
and assuming that all voters not included in the final sam-
ple are non-strategic voters, we conclude that some 3% of
voters in 1998 and 1% in 2002 voted strategically. Given
these numbers, strategic voting is clearly not a large scale
phenomenon at German elections. Especially when com-
pared with other published estimates of strategic voting,
ranging roughly in between 5% to 17%, depending on
measurement (see Alvarez and Nagler, 2000, Table 1),
German voters appear to be somewhat less responsive toStrategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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in pure FPTP systems, such as Great Britain or Canada.
But there are other possible explanations for this result.
For instance, voter preferences in Germany are
highly ‘‘skewed’’, in the sense that there is a large
bias towards CDU and SPD. Together, the two parties
appear about three times as often on first preference
as any other party. Hence it should be no surprise that
most voters cast a sincere constituency vote for either
the CDU or SPD candidate (see also Blais and Nadeau,
1996, for a very similar conclusion).
Wemay also underestimate the true amount of strate-
gic voting due to our strict definition of the phenomenon.
Recall that all respondents with a tied preference on first
rank were excluded from the analysis. A more generous
definition of strategic voting would perhaps allow for
defecting one’s preferred candidate in favor of a more
successful but equally preferred candidate. Expanding
the outcome category in such a way would certainly
lead to more observed strategic behavior. Our aim was,
however, to show that voters sometimes truly vote
against their preferences rather than merely selecting
between options of equal value.
Lastly, the extent to which voters engage in strategic
voting may vary significantly between elections. For in-
stance,Blais et al. (2001)findabout 6%of strategic voting
at the 1988 Canadian election but only half as much in
1997. The variability of strategic voting over longer pe-
riods of time is yet completely unexplored, so we can
hardly place reliable upper and lower bounds on estimates
from any single country. Thus, strictly speaking, we can-
not tell whether the estimates produced here are in the up-
per, lower or mid-part of the distribution of strategic
voting at German elections and the same caveat applies,
in principle, to other strategic voting estimates. The pres-
ence of variability over time makes it hard, in general, to
compare strategic voting estimates irrespective of mea-
surement or methodology. Therefore we should not de-
mand too much of the present effort and take the results
as mere indication for the notion that strategic voting in
German constituency elections occurs, albeit at a lower
magnitude than usually found in plurality elections.
5. Discussion
This study aimed at providing evidence for strategic
voting in constituencies of German Bundestag elec-
tions. Employing a decision theoretic approach, we for-
mulated an individual-level model that allowed us to
consider the full range of situations in which voters
might potentially cast a strategic constituency ballot.
We found evidence for sophisticated balloting in bothPlease cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007elections under study, whereby voters adjust their be-
havior to the electoral situation in their local environ-
ment instead of merely going for the most preferred
alternative. Specifically, the more likely a voter is to in-
fluence the race between her second and third prefer-
ence and the stronger her preference between the two,
the more likely she was found to vote for second prefer-
ence, i.e. to vote strategically. On the other hand, the
more likely she is to have an impact on the race between
her first and second or first and third preference and the
more she favors her first preference over the other two,
the more likely she was found to vote for her first pref-
erence, i.e. to vote sincerely.
Coming back to the question posed in the beginning
about the boundaries of voter sophistication, our model
predictions suggest that strategic voting is not a large
scale phenomenon at German federal elections. In fact,
it appears to be of substantially smaller scale than what
is commonly observed for pure FPTP systems, with
the caveat that definitions and measurement as well as
the actual amount strategic voting itself in a given
election may vary between studies.
The theoretical framework and research strategy taken
here is inspired by earlier attempts to uncover strategic
voting in Canada (Black, 1978), Great Britain (Cain,
1978) or the US (Ordeshook and Zeng, 1997). The main
advantages of assessing strategic voting in this way are
flexibility and theoretical clarity. We started off with
a general decision-theoretic model and adjusted it subse-
quently to fit the electoral situation inGerman constituen-
cies. Strategic voting in other countries could be studied in
a similar way. An even more informed perspective could
be obtained by employing the above approach as a tem-
plate for inter-temporal and cross-national comparisons.
Thus, we might ask whether voters in different electoral
systems, e.g. mixed vs. pure FPTP respond differently
to electoral incentives? Likewise, we could investigate
whether levels of strategic voting vary not only within
but also between elections; for instance, do elections
with many close races, on average, exhibit more strategic
voting than elections with less competition on the constit-
uency level? In comparing overall levels of strategic vot-
ing aswell as voter elasticities towards local constituency
races within and across countries we may gain more in-
sights into the general conditions that give rise to strategic
voting.
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A.1. Construction of P variables
Let E denote an election outcome between three can-
didates 1, 2 and 3, that is E ¼ (e1,e2,e3). For simplicity,
we consider outcomes where e1 > e2 > e3. Given an
election outcome E, a measure for the decisiveness of
a vote in the race between candidates 1 and 2 can be
constructed from the distance between E and an out-
come in which the two candidates would be tied for vic-
tory, while holding the share of the third candidate
constant. Intuitively, this can be thought of as the min-
imum change in the election outcome required to make
a single voter decisive (Black, 1978, 634). To express
this formally, let T denote any election outcome in
which the two leading candidates would be tied for vic-
tory, i.e. T ¼ (t1,t2,t3) with t1 ¼ t2 > t3. The Euclidian
distance between outcomes E and T is defined as
kETk¼ ½ðe1 t1Þ2þðe2 t2Þ2þðe3 t3Þ21=2. Since, at
T, candidates 1 and 2 obtain equal vote shares,
t1¼ t2¼ðe1þe2Þ=2. Furthermore, since the vote share
of candidate 3 is held constant, e3 ¼ t3. Inserting these
constraints into the Euclidian distance formula and
rearranging yields the following simple expression:
kETk ¼ 1ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p ðe1  e2Þ ð4Þ
Note that, according to Black (1978, 636), the above
constraints should lead to the expression
kETk ¼
e1
2
2
þ
e2
2
2
e1e2
1=2
However, the correct result is
kETk ¼

e21 þ e22
2
 e1e2
1=2
which can be further simplified to yield the above result.
The distance measure in Eq. (4) reaches a maximum of
1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
, i.e. if one candidate wins 100% of the vote. As
can be seen from Eq. (4), the Euclidian distance of
a given election result to a result in which 1 and 2 are
tied for victory depends only on the district margin,
i.e. the absolute difference between the vote shares of
1 and 2. Margin and Euclidian distance differ only by
a scaling constant 1=
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
. We normalize by dividing
through the maximum, and subtract from one to obtain
the measure P12:
P12 ¼ 1
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
kETk ð5ÞPlease cite this article in press as: Herrmann, M., Franz Urban Pappi,
doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2007.10.007This measure takes on values from zero, if one can-
didate wins all votes, to one, if candidates 1 and 2 are
tied for victory. As can be seen from Eqs. (4) and (5),
our measure P12 is equal to the complement of the dis-
trict margin.
The above measures were defined with respect to
P12, the probability of being decisive between the two
leading candidates. But they can also be used to com-
pute the distance to a tie for the lead between candidates
1 and 3, simply by replacing e2 with e3. However, calcu-
lating kETk is meaningful only if e2  1=3, i.e. the sec-
ond finisher does not win more than one-third of the
vote. Otherwise, if e2  1=3, kETk would be the dis-
tance to an outcome in which a voter would only be de-
cisive in determining the second place between
candidates 1 and 3 but not the winner, as the winner
would be candidate 2 (see Black, 1978, 637). Thus,
whenever the second place finisher obtains more than
one-third of the vote, we calculate P13 according to
Eqs. (6) and (7), below.
For the calculation of P23 we employ a different dis-
tance measure. As we are not interested in the distance
of E to the line of ties between candidates 2 and 3, be-
cause 2 and 3 both lose the election to 1, the probability
of being decisive between 2 and 3 is irrelevant to the
election outcome unless candidate 1’s share is altered.
Following Black, we take the distance to a three-way
tie M ¼ ð1=3; 1=3; 1=3Þ as an indicator for the mini-
mum change in 1, 2 and 3’s shares required to make
a voter decisive in determining victory between 2 and
3. Euclidian distance between E and M is given by:
kEMk ¼
	
e1  1
3

2
þ
	
e2  1
3

2
þ
	
e3  1
3

21=2
ð6Þ
This distance measure reaches a maximum of
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2=3
p
.
As above we normalize to obtain the measure:
P23 ¼ 1
ﬃﬃﬃ
3
2
r
kEMk ð7Þ
Together, the measures defined in Eqs. (5)e(7) suf-
fice to compute all relevant P-variables for the analysis
in Section 4.
A.2. Feeling thermometer question
‘‘Generally speaking, what do you think of the
parties?What do you think of [CDU, SPD, FDP, Greens,
PDS]?’’5 ‘‘I think nothing of that party’’ to 5 ‘‘I think
a great deal of that party’’ (translation is our own).Strategic voting in German constituencies, Electoral Stud. (2007),
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